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Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. 318 pp. ISBN 0674019959. 
Reviewed by Jon Solomon, University of Minnesota 
An impressive blend of archival research, theoretical reflection, and political intervention, Lydia 
Liu's The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (henceforth 
abbreviated as The Clash) constructs a fascinating genealogical account of the intense battles and 
negotiations around concepts of civilization and sovereignty, power and meaning. Spanning 
several centuries of interaction between two very different empires—that of the British and that 
of the Manchu-Qing—the unlikely crux of this genealogy is translation. Liu calls it the "semiotic 
turn in International Politics." 
The Clash is a history of translation in every sense of the history in which translation names the 
crucial operations of "invention" and "world-making" cited in the work's provocative title. 
Indeed, if we are ever going to overcome the exceptionalism of national history instituted since 
the nineteenth century and move on to develop new modes of telling stories about the past that 
are neither mythic nor substitutions exchanging the framework of civilization for that of the 
nation while still preserving the basic structure of exceptionalism, translation will, by definition, 
play a central role. A growing body of engaged scholarship, among which the writings of Lydia 
Liu must be given special prominence, shows that translation has played a crucial, biopolitical 
role in the transition from ancient imperial realms to a single, global world divided into a 
geocultural system of sovereign nation-states. Translation, as The Clash would have us 
understand it, not only makes history (being the praxis of a self-aware subject of knowledge 
upon its own conditions of possibility), but of equal importance, also makes a world (the frame 
or ground without which subjectivity would seem to be impossible). The legacy of this modern 
regime of translation is not limited to the historical injustice inscribed in the framework of 
international law and the geocultural divisions over which it normatively presides (i.e., it is not 
limited to the Eurocentric legacy of world history as such) but extends in fact to encompass the 
disciplinary divisions of the human sciences, the anthropological presuppositions upon which 
they are based (even today), and, perhaps most pertinent, the geopolitical divisions of the 
post/colonial world order that organize, justify, and rationalize biopolitical violence. It is no 
wonder, then, that the narrative voice regularly shuttles between redressing injustice in the 
distant past and pointing out its specters in the present (or, really the recent past—what amounts 
to the present in the specialized temporality of academic writing and recognition). In the fashion 
of the best postcolonial criticism, Liu invites the reader to stand witness not just before the way 
in which English imperialism manipulated expressions of right and injury to legitimate the defeat 
of another empire by projecting upon it the negative image of imperialism's own conjuring 
barbarism, but also before the infiltration of this othering conjuration into the norms that 
structure knowledge in the postcolonial period. Like Michel Foucault's work, which wrestled the 
archival method of research away from historicism and turned it into a means of genealogical 
inquiry, a "history of the present" whose primary interest lay not in the perfection of historical 
knowledge whose function was largely aesthetic, if not downright anesthetic, but in the 
transformation of the subject of knowledge herself, Lydia Liu's work is constantly mindful of the 
overwhelming prejudice that continues even today to structure the entire economy of comparison 
from which the disciplinary divisions of the human sciences derive their legitimacy. 
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An exemplary instance of Liu's acute awareness can be found in the author's brief introduction to 
Charles Peirce's concept of the symbol—which forms, along with the icon and the index, a triad 
that defines the semiotic object. While the icon is mimetic and the index is deictic, the symbol 
pertains to the realm of the conventional. What is unique about Liu's treatment of Peirce is the 
way in which she draws our attention to the operation of translation implicit in the etymological 
gesture without which Peirce cannot establish the conventional meaning of the word "symbol." 
The coexistence of multiple definitions in the ancient Greek that triggers indeterminacy 
throughout the signifying chain suggests how "conventions"—such as linguistic usage and 
translational equivalence—inevitably refer in the modern era to juridical institutions such as the 
state that regulate a series of thorny ontological questions concerning the status of the individual. 
It would be impossible in the space of a review to describe the problems of individuation, let 
alone the connection between the state form, translation and metaphysics, yet a minimum 
familiarity with the problem is necessary to proceed with our review. By individuation, we mean 
the problem which can be summarized under the question, how is it that something comes to be 
counted as one? Leibniz's assertion that holds "that which is not one being is not a being" 
emblematizes (or translates) an entire tradition of ontological presuppositions. Clearly, some sort 
of presupposition of discrete individuation plays a crucial role in what Liu calls the "hypothetical 
equivalence" essential to the modern regime of translation. Without the presupposition of an 
ontological equivalence between entity and unity, there could be no way to posit equivalence. 
The denouement of these problems lies, of course, beyond the scope of this review, but we shall 
consider some of the implications. 
Peirce's response to the problems of individuation in relation to primary nominalization was to 
introduce a necessary fiction—the scene of an imaginary "first encounter" between peoples with 
no historical memory of contact—and then to use that scene as a vehicle to privilege "mimetic 
iconicity," i.e., the primacy of the mimetic and the deictic, over the symbolic. Liu astutely ups 
the ante by reminding readers that seemingly innocuous theoretical fictions such as "first 
encounters" often conceal real injustice. Daniel Dafoe's ode to sovereign individualism, 
Robinson Crusoe, provides the archetypical instance of the Peircean scene, concretized in the 
specificity of social relationships marked by colonial difference and colonial violence. Lacking 
any common language, Crusoe attempts to communicate his command of the situation to Friday 
by means of pointing his gun at a parrot, firing the gun, and killing the parrot. Needless to say, 
parrots only mimic, they do not point; hence, the ultimate supremacy of Crusoe's power is 
deictic: it does what it says. Liu observes, in a passage to be relished as much for its understated 
clarity as for its far-reaching implications: 
To Crusoe, the failure of communication poses an immediate threat because it means that 
Friday would not recognize him as the sovereign of the island or his gun as that 
"wonderful Fund of Death and Destruction." His first task, then, is to terrorize Friday, to 
make him comprehend the sovereign power of himself and his gun and be subjugated. 
(16) 
Since Hegel, the discourse of modernity has been founded on a dialectic of recognition that 
ultimately forms the negative basis of the modern political system organized around the principle 
of sovereignty. The doublespeak regularly utilized in contemporary public debate has probably 
obscured from memory the fact that "terror" in the modern political sense originally—and 
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exclusively—referred to violence undertaken by a state against its "own" or another population. 
When Liu emphasizes "that the power of Crusoe's gun lies not in its physical ability to take the 
other's life but in its very indexicality as a sign of terror" (16), Liu has put her finger, so to speak, 
on nothing less than the founding metaphysical myth of the modern state. 
The state, of course, cannot be thought without reference to violence, and in the context of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century imperialism, the relation between the two as well as the 
composition of each undergoes tremendous change. It is not a question of reviewing this history 
here: we are all familiar with the Hobbesian myth concerning the nature of political violence—
the quintessentially modern myth (the very concept of myth being intrinsically modern) which 
holds that without the beneficent mediation of the State, human populations would be reduced to 
a barbaric "state of nature," the war of all against all. This barbaric "state" is projected onto a 
hypothetical historical origin, giving rise to the time-worn distinction between civilization and 
barbarism that articulates a hypothetical teleology—the supposition of progress so highly prized 
by moderns—to an equally fictitious notion of sovereign power as being precisely that power 
which is so exceptional, it does not require any justification whatsoever outside of its own, self-
appointed nature of decision (over life-and-death). Concomitant with the Hobbesian myth of a 
"state of nature," there is a corresponding series of hypotheses about how power arises from the 
barrel of a gun, and, in a metaphysical register, about the primacy of indication over signification 
(not to mention the fundamental discernability of the two). By combining these two hypotheses, 
we arrive at what ought to be called, in a name that draws from the implicit in Liu's argument, 
the irreducible indexicality of sovereign terror.  
At this point, the savvy reader will be deeply rewarded by back-tracking a few pages in the 
narrative to return to Liu's earlier remarks about Peirce's discussion of Greek etymology for the 
word "symbol." Here, we find a devastating critique aimed at a philosophical program common 
to much of modern scholarship: "Peirce is clearly engaged in a manner of reasoning, common 
among those who look toward Greek or Latin roots to help secure the meaning of modern words, 
that requires the hand of translation to perform the etymology yet simultaneously occults the 
traces of that redoubled, authorizing gesture" (12). The philosophical kernel of this intellectual 
project comprises two different steps. The first, which is metaphysical, distinguishes between 
indication and signification by virtue of a series of exceptions that establish the legitimacy of the 
distinction, yet do it in such a way as to generate signs (what modern linguistics since Roman 
Jakobson calls the "shifters" that indicate nothing but the instance of discourse) that control the 
metaphysical shift or oscillation between the two. The second, which is political, establishes the 
fictional unity of community by means of translation. In Peirce's case, the exception concerns 
one of the two etymological meanings of the ancient Greek word symbolum, and Liu deftly 
shows how the act of translation itself exemplifies Peirce's understanding of the symbol much 
better than his own etymological explanations. True to the poststructuralist understanding of 
translation, Liu holds that all linguistic practice is accompanied by the epistemological problems 
of metaphor that defy a rigorous distinction between indication and signification. Yet the true 
effectiveness of the etymological gesture utilized by Peirce lies in a surplus meaning that effaces 
the trace of the translational moment. Although Liu regrettably is not interested—at least not up 
to this point in her career—in pursuing this critique of the etymological gesture to attack the 
well-ensconced edifice of scholarship and political thought built upon the presupposition of 
civilizational identity actually derived from the effacement of translation), her critique of Peirce 
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is quite effective in setting the stage for the central innovative concept advanced by the book, 
what Liu calls "the super-sign." 
In this context, it would be apposite to remark that a sustained reflection on the metaphysical 
problem of indication and signification and its possible consequences for modern political 
philosophy has been undertaken by the contemporary Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. 
Although Liu cites Agamben in reference to the latter's well-known, later work on sovereignty, 
Homo Sacer (1994); she does not relate it to Agamben's seminal work, Language and 
Death(1991), a book whose consideration of the metaphysical oscillation between indication and 
signification not only establishes the trajectory that will be pursued by Agamben in his later 
studies of sovereignty but also would, it seems to me, be germane to the context of Liu's own 
discussion of indexicality, colonial violence and translation in The Clash. Agamben's sensitivity 
to the metaphysical problems initiated by linguistic shifters does not prevent him from 
succumbing to the Peircean gesture identified by Liu, whereby a certain historical narrative about 
first-time events in Western culture, politics, and philosophy occurs through the instantiation of 
indication ("see, the West is right there!") accomplished by the transfer of signification through 
translation. The question to be posed to Peirce, Agamben, and the plethora of other scholars like 
them, is not whether there are archives of texts bearing within them all manner of material 
differences as well as a high-degree of intertextual referentiality organized around shared 
themes, conceptual concerns, and inherited signs. The question, rather, concerns the relation 
between those archives and social formation. What is "tradition" but both the presupposition and 
concomitant effacement of translation? That which distinguishes modernity as an epoch is not 
the presence of practices and symbols inherited from the past, nor the fact that communication 
with people who may not understand me is necessary, but rather the organization of such 
essentially practical and social differences according to a spatialized representation of 
translation as exchange between commensurate communal entities—an understanding that 
essentially hides both the heterogeneity of the translator (and the social relations that call for 
translation) and the heterogeneity of the languages that supposedly preexist the translational 
encounter. In previous work collected in a volume titled Translingual Practice (1995), Liu had 
already posed these questions, explicitly placing her work in the context of reflections opened up 
by twentieth-century thinkers from Walter Benjamin to Jacques Derrida. Liu takes her distance, 
however, vis-à-vis these Europeanists suggesting that "Perhaps the thing to do is to go beyond 
the deconstructionist stage of trying to prove that equivalents do not exist and look, instead, into 
their manner of becoming" (16). Nearly a decade later, The Clash carries on that fecund promise, 
taking the examination of "how hypothetical equivalents come into being" to a new depth of 
scholarly accomplishment.  
That which is, however, overlooked in the process of this fascinating intellectual itinerary is the 
kernel of invention inherent in some of the better instances of deconstructive reading. (Jeffrey 
Nealon argues, in Double Reading [1996], that this would be the difference between the de 
Manian and Derridean versions of deconstruction, the former lending itself to sterile 
institutionalizations, the latter promoting fertile cross-boundary pollinations.) In contrast to Liu, 
who sees deconstruction simply as a "stage" at which illusions such as the hypothetical 
equivalency established by translation between otherwise incommensurate languages are 
shattered, philosophies of difference enable a radical liberation from notions of language as a 
totality the closure of which can be reduced to the exteriority of a referent to a signifier. I am 
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convinced, in other words, that the deconstructive understanding of translation is much more 
expansive than Liu assumes. It enables us to see that translation is precisely what constitutes 
"languages"—understood in the modern sense as systematic totalities—as such to begin with. 
This thesis was implicit, we would argue, in the discussions of translation advanced by Jacques 
Derrida in a series of works from the 1980s. (Readers may consult the second half of Jacques 
Derrida's Du droit à la philosophie [1990].) True, he did not grasp this radical possibility in a 
fundamental and concrete way—we attribute this inability to the inherently Eurocentric limits of 
his formation in the sense described by Gayatri Spivak—leaving it to languish as a theoretical 
possibility. The honor of that accomplishment must be credited to Naoki Sakai, whose work on 
translation surpasses Derrida by going where the latter's work would go if only it could, 
effectively realizing the inherently inventive possibilities of deconstruction. Tobias Warner's 
summary of Sakai's position on translation is classic and deserves, in this context, full citation: 
Naoki Sakai's claim [is] that translation is not a bridge between languages, but rather what 
divides them. This inversion stems from the deduction that only in translating can one actually 
claim to deal with two distinct languages. What we commonly conceive of as "translation", then, 
is a strategy for defining and managing the difference between languages. This most common 
representation of translation is complicit with diverse strategies of domination and 
subjectification: because it territorializes linguistic communities, translation elides the 
fundamental discontinuity that precedes it, manufacturing manageable species difference out of 
the singularity and incommensurability of languages. In his Translation and Subjectivity, Sakai 
shows how "Japan" as a nation became thinkable only when a group of eighteenth-century 
scholars translated texts from Chinese into Japanese, a non-distinct language their work 
performed into existence. The implications of this way of thinking about translation are more 
than conceptual. Each territorialized, unitary language is paired off against another 
commensurable unity—a move that in turn enables the representation of larger unities, such as 
"the nation" or "the West." (Warner, "Bodies and Tongues: Alternative Modes of Translation in 
Francophone African Literature") 
Translation creates not just the hypothesis of equivalency that Liu reveals to be unmanageable, it 
also creates an illusion of self-sufficiency in place of (the reality) of relation. The most common 
form of this illusory self-sufficiency is the idea that discrete languages pre-exist the translational 
situation, making "translation" into a relatively secondary, exceptional case vis-à-vis the 
mainstream of normal language usage (precisely the position adopted, for instance, by 
Jakobson). Many of the familiar disciplinary divisions of the human sciences are fundamentally 
based on this linguistic assumption.  
Liu's position amounts to a tense dialogue with deconstructive philosophies of difference that 
capitalizes upon many of their fundamental insights and themes without, however, subscribing to 
the radical indeterminacy such work implies. Liu's work constantly arrests the deconstructive 
machine precisely at the point at which originary difference might call into question the positing 
of discrete, different languages that pre-exist the indeterminacy of the translational exchange. 
This interdiction is nowhere more evident than in Liu's concept of the super-sign. Properly 
speaking," Liu writes, 
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a super-sign is not a word but a hetero-cultural signifying chain that crisscrosses the 
semantic fields of two or more languages simultaneously … The super-sign emerges out 
of the interstices of existing languages across the abyss of phonetic and ideographic 
differences. As a hetero-cultural signifying chain, it always requires more than one 
linguistic system to complete the process of signification for any given verbal 
phenomenon. (13) 
The super-sign, in other words, is the conceptual apparatus by means of which Liu intends to 
resolve (or again, to deploy and yet contain) the fundamental indeterminacy unleashed by 
deconstructive practice.  
The problems posed by the concept of the super-sign do not stop there, and it is fitting that our 
main axis of approach intervenes in the specific details of the one "super-sign" discussed in detail 
by Liu—the "three-way commensurability of the hetero-linguistic sign 夷/i/barbarian" (33). 
Discussion of this super-sign in Chapters Two and Three forms—together with Chapter Four's 
marvelous discussion of the role played by translation in the establishment of the self-justifying 
universalism instituted by nineteenth-century international law—the theoretically challenging 
part of the work. Although the word yi had been deftly domesticated by the Manchu rulers that 
assumed the Imperial throne in 1644 into a discursive regime that was essentially geographic, the 
British encounter with the crumbling Manchu-Qing empire two centuries later irrevocably 
ethnicized the word. This ethnicization was accomplished by a fantastic equivalency to the 
English word barbarian. As part of the series of "unequal treaties" imposed upon the Qing, 
usage of the term yi was banned from currency in official Qing documents by Article 51 of the 
Treaty of Tianjin (1858). 
Significantly, the hypothetical equivalency enforced by international treaty enabled a compelling 
narrative in comparative civilizational history that establishes a parallel between the ancient 
Greek world-view and the imperial Chinese one. Liu's seminal insight about the specious role of 
translation—particularly from ancient Greek and Latin—in establishing the authority and 
identity of tradition is apposite here. In effect, the representation of equivalency between Chinese 
and English enabled by translation serves to efface the crucial role that translation had already 
played in the establishment of an ancient Greek lineage supposedly inherent to "Western 
civilization." This representation has, over the course of two centuries, become virtually 
unquestioned, forming the basis, for instance, for the notoriously misleading (we should say, 
prejudiced) history of Chinese racism seen in Frank Dikötter's The Discourse of Race in Modern 
China (1994)—a work that essentially exonerates the West through a discourse of comparative 
civilizational history by exhibiting the fundamental ethnocentrism and racism of other historical 
populations such as China. The Clash is thus an important intervention into a form of prejudice 
inherited from the colonial era that forms the pernicious part of "common sense" held in honor 
by contemporary popular and academic discourse alike. This intervention is significant not just 
for Chinese studies but for popular understanding about China as well; needless to say, it also 
conveys significant implications for the understanding of the non-West (beyond China), and calls 
for us to undertake a thorough critique of the ways in which the colonial prejudice continues to 
haunt contemporary knowledge and social relations. Liu's work forms an essential, leading 
contribution to this project. 
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A technical niggle in the way Liu constructs her understanding of the crucial super-sign 
yi/barbarian calls, however, for greater scrutiny. Shortly after introducing the "three-way 
commensurability of the hetero-linguistic sign" composed by the Chinese character 夷, its 
romanization as I, or again yi, and the English word barbarian, Liu parenthetically explains that 
the super-sign will henceforth be "represented as yi/barbarian for convenience" (33). Liu does 
not explain the basis for this convenience. We can assume it is designed to be reader-friendly 
while at the same time economizing on the considerable editorial cost posed by inserting Chinese 
characters into English print books. (The book follows the convention of providing a useful 
glossary of Chinese characters for which specialist readers are bound to feel grateful.) The 
otherwise insignificant and user-friendly elision of the Chinese character becomes a bit more 
complicated, however, as the reader realizes that it parallels a fundamental, theoretical oversight 
in Liu's approach to comparative linguistics that bears profound implications for some parts of 
the historical argument deployed by The Clash.  
Although Liu writes at great length about translation and romanization, she does not consider the 
difference between transcription and transliteration and their relation to the nationalization 
(standardization) of language instituted by modern states, including colonial ones. John 
Whitman, a specialist of Japanese and Korean linguistics, has observed that in the course of 
colonial history transcription became the dominant mode of romanization, supplanting 
transliteration. Whitman calls this "colonial romanization" and pointedly reminds us that the 
initial "consumers of colonial romanizations were not in the first place native speakers, and the 
purpose of these systems was at least partially pedagogical" ("Transliteration: a Brief History," 
paper delivered at the faculty fellow seminar on translation, Society for the Humanities, Cornell 
University, October 31, 2004). Whitman's observations become significant when considered in 
the context of historical nationalization. The colonial romanization, based on a view of language 
that fundamentally incorporates the perspective of the foreigner, not only comprises an implicit 
moment of translation, it also becomes the basis for the national romanization systems used in 
the process of constructing nation-states in East Asia. Romanization systems are part of the 
pedagogical system of national education in most, if not all, East Asian states today. Needless to 
say, linguistic pedagogy is not just a technical convenience but comprises an irreducible 
ideological component for the construction of a modern nation-state, as native populations with 
their myriad differences have to be reorganized into members of a homogeneous national 
community. This is precisely what Liu, following Derrida, calls "the foreigner within the 
sovereign subject" (106); and it must be distinguished from another sort of "foreigner" that 
would be the sign, in deconstructive parlance, of originary difference (precisely what sovereignty 
tries to master in a metaphysical sense). This foreigner is not the one that is constructed in 
symmetrical form by competing nationalisms, but the one that comes before and escapes all 
dialectics of sovereignty.  
Eliding the Chinese character 夷 allows us to forget the fact that before the twentieth century, 
there was no standard "Chinese" pronunciation for that character. Indeed, seen from the 
perspective of modernity, with its nationalized languages, ideographs such as Chinese characters 
seem inherently designed to obviate the need for translation. Written the same way, 夷 could be 
pronounced in any number of different ways, depending upon the "dialect" in use. In other 
words, I (yi) is a transcription, not a transliteration. Of course, the term "dialect" in reference to 
non-standard Sinic languages such as Cantonese, Hokkienese, Shanghainese, etc., or again other, 
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non-Sinic languages such as Korean, Japanese and Vietnamese, etc., is itself part of the ideology 
of national language instituted by the modern idea of sovereignty. For this very reason, the nexus 
of thorny questions concerning the convenience of proper nouns referring to nationalized 
languages and peoples cannot be easily put to rest by simple "deconstruction." The possibility of 
talking about such differences without subscribing, in our terminology, to nationalized 
appellations remains to be invented. As Agamben notes: "it is only by breaking the nexus 
between the existence of language, grammar, people and state that thought and praxis will be 
equal to the tasks at hand" ("Language and Peoples" 69). As an interim measure, it does not 
require a great deal of imagination to explore the repressed aspects of historical difference. For 
instance, what are called "dialects" today certainly could have supported the same project of 
nationalization to which Mandarin was actually subjected. (Indeed, in the course of the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, some activists proposed such measures; contemporary 
advocates of a nationalized "Taiwanese" language provide yet another example.) Hence, the 
equivalency legislated by the infamous Article 51 of the Tianjin Treaty concerns not just that 
between Chinese and English, but also that between I (yi) and 夷 such that difference is codified 
and incorporated into a unitary formation called "Chinese." Although such an insight might be 
thought to be Eurocentric inasmuch as it would appear to grant the English word barbarian a 
certain organic unity vis-à-vis the English social formation, this idea can be dispelled when we 
take into account the work of postcolonial scholars like Gauri Viswanathan, who shows that 
popular English literary education—destined to educate the working classes in proper national 
identity—was actually developed and informed by practices in the colonies (India).  
It is thus ironic that the example of the super-sign discussed by The Clash unwittingly serves to 
establish a hypothetical equivalence between Chinese and English as national languages even as 
it adroitly builds a critical narrative about the "manner of becoming" specific to a particular form 
of hypothetical equivalency—that established by translation in the nineteenth century which 
served to mobilize the inequities of colonial difference and codify them in international law (not 
to mention disciplinary knowledge). We must not forget that other salient form of 
incommensurability between "Chinese" and "English" overlooked by Liu in her discussion of the 
nineteenth century: English, by this time, was already entering into a stage of high 
nationalization (whereby differences are homogenized and re-codified by class); by contrast, 
"Chinese" was a highly differentiated imperial formation (including multi-cultural and multi-
lingual variation as well as social "class" status) typical of pre-modern social formations. In 
effect, we are suggesting a new form of historical narrative in which all manner of differences—
from class to ethnicity and gender—would need to be reinscribed in a new framework of 
minoritarian relations composed of labor, life, and language.  
It should be clear now why I feel considerable confidence in concluding—and repeating—that 
the "super-sign" is the conceptual apparatus by means of which Liu intends to resolve (or again, 
to deploy and yet contain) the fundamental indeterminacy unleashed by deconstructive practice. I 
doubt that such a resolution is theoretically necessary and hence am not surprised that Liu has 
proposed the idea—which seems philosophically untenable to me—of "substitut[ing] the notion 
of competing universalisms for cultural particularity to help understand the modes of cultural 
exchange and their genealogies beyond the existing accounts of colonial encounter" ("The 
Question of Meaning-Value in the Political Economy of the Sign," 19). Any universalism worth 
its salt could not possibly comprehend a different, separate universalism: differences would be 
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intrinsically comprehended as particularities. This is probably the most common fallacy 
informing comparative work today: since any number of different historical civilizations can be 
made into objects of knowledge, comparison between such objects becomes inevitable. What is 
consistently disavowed, however, is that the terms of comparison are fundamentally subjective. 
This is quite different from disqualifying the relative objectivity of archival sources and 
historical knowledge; it is rather to admit that the only way social objects can be construed and 
then compared is from the point of view of the subject that triangulates their relation. From the 
point of the view of the actual social formations themselves—inasmuch as they really aspire to 
universalism at the level of knowledge (rather than, say, praxis)—relations to other social 
formations would have to be understood as the relation between a universal and a particular 
(otherwise the social formation in question could not know itself to be "universal"). The call for 
studies in competing universalisms necessarily assumes another, presupposed level (i.e., that of 
triangulation) that constitutes, in this context, the "true" universal. The subject that apprehends 
these objects, triangulates their distance, and compares them in terms of their "competing 
universalism," knows not only both objects but also thatneither of the objects is simply 
"universal" (the universalism of each is relativized by the comparison with a competing other). 
The practical effect of studies undertaken in this mode would be to reinforce the presupposition 
that the only real universal lies in the (hidden) subject of knowledge today. In terms of practical 
effects it is clear that such privileging of the subject of knowledge comes at the price of 
dampening the possibilities for subjective invention at the level of praxis otherwise promised by 
the work.  
Apart from these niggles and quibbles, The Clash sets the record straight on the abuse of 
civilization and sovereignty in the institution of colonial violence (a history that repeats itself 
today in relations like those between the United States and Iraq) and provides the only viable 
horizon against which the vaunted contemporary Chinese national chauvinism should be 
measured: the crux of the problem lies, then and now, in the violence of colonialism and the 
subtle ways in which that violence has been instituted. Such institutions cover both social ones 
such as law as well as epistemological ones such as disciplinary knowledge. What is called "the 
West" is really not an identity at all, but the name for a certain bipolar relationship in which a 
dominant pole disavows the relationship, setting itself up as exceptional. Armed with the 
advantage of this exception, it then proceeds, by means of exploitation and destruction, to 
actualize the previous disavowal. It cannot be stressed too much that the purpose of this measure 
is not to substantiate an economy of ressentiment in the postcolonial subject (which would favor 
the creation of identities based on the model of return), but rather to unlock possibilities for the 
creation of new subjectivities that are completely liberated from (post)colonial sovereignty. Liu's 
critique of Negri and Hardt is essential: 
The genealogy of modern sovereignty as traced out by postcolonial scholars is 
sufficiently different from the Eurocentric ones constructed by Foucault, Bataille, 
Agamben, and even Hardt and Negri as to merit serious consideration. The main point of 
dissent, as I view it, is whether coloniality enters the big picture in the manner of a 
belated negative dialectic or as the originary condition of modern sovereignty. The 
postcolonial scholar would argue that modern sovereignty is colonial sovereignty tout 
court rather than its negative mirror image, and, by extension, what Hardt and Negri 
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identify as imperial sovereignty should be properly grasped as a response to postcolonial 
sovereignty. (25) 
Modern sovereignty is colonial sovereignty.  
Conclusions such as this make The Clash exciting and required reading for those interested in 
international relations and biopolitics today. It is to be hoped that the "missed opportunity," as 
Liu laments, "to engage seriously with the challenge that postcolonial scholars … have presented 
[to Negri and Hardt] and to intellectual discourse in general" (248) is only a temporary setback, 
not a strategic defeat, on the road to the invention of new, practical subjectivities. 
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